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Abstract—The IoT industry is still suffering from major 
security shortcomings, despite an increasing focus on the 
area. This is due to both a lack of security expertise 
among developers and a lack of good security solutions 
for IoT infrastructure. When development starts, it is 
the functionality that places the greatest emphasis and 
security is either forgotten or there simply is no time for 
it. The lack of security is also affected by the resource 
constraints on many IoT devices. Some IoT devices have 
the capacity to run an OS, but the devices most widely 
used today are simple microcontrollers, which often 
have small, simple, and very specific tasks. To resolve 
this problem, SSL certificates are a secure solution and a 
prototype implementation is showcased.  
Keywords—Web Services and Cloud-Based e-Services; 
Security, Privacy and Trust for e-Service 
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) and security is an issue that is 
becoming more and more relevant as the number of IoT 
devices is increasing worldwide, and more and more are 
being exposed, hacked and abused as a result of poor security 
implementations. Thereby increasing the importance to 
investigate different IoT devices and identify what 
opportunities there are in securing these. Many IoT devices 
have few resources available, which limits the methods that 
can be used. This makes security on IoT devices challenging 
and there are currently no simple steps developers can take to 
secure their IoT devices. 
Internet of Things is a broad concept with several definitions. 
In general, an IoT device is a physical thing connected to the 
Internet to either transmit data it has read through sensors or 
receive data that it can act on with actuators. In the work by 
McEwen and Cassimally [1] they define IoT to cover all 
devices that use the Internet to send and receive data, and are 
not a computer, phone, or tablet. In the "Internet of Things", 
"things" are physical devices with sensors and / or actuators. 
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 
makes it very short by calling IoT a network of things that are 
connected to the internet and where each device has sensors 
[2]. The International Telecommunication Union defines IoT 
as a global infrastructure that offers advanced services by 
utilizing existing information and communication 
technologies to connect things [3]. More specifically, they 
define "things" as something that is capable of being 
integrated into a communication network. At the same time, 
one thing is not just something in the physical world, but also 
something that can be part of the virtual. IoT involves the 
collection, processing and transport of data.  
Interestingly there is less emphasis on the fact that 
modern IoT solutions must face continuously stricter security 
and confidentiality requirements. 
II. RELATED WORK
Many of the same threats that exist elsewhere in technical 
solutions and software architectures also apply to IoT [4]. 
Some IoT devices are more vulnerable than others, depending 
on which scenarios they are linked to. For some units, it will 
be important for data to be kept confidential, while for others 
i.e. a temperature measurement. Real-time device tracking
can pose a security risk if data is not sent and kept
confidential. Further to this, many of the same attacks we see
against IoT are also common in technology. In many cases,
IoT can be more vulnerable than other areas standard IT
solutions because IoT devices are often located in places with
easy physical access to the device. If an attacker has the
ability to physically access an IoT device, there are several
attacks they can make.
With physical access, it will be possible to install malicious 
software on the device, i.e. through keystroke injectors that 
pretend to be keyboards and very quickly type commands to 
the device they are connected to. This can be used, among 
other things, to install backdoors, which can allow the 
attacker to enable hidden functionality remotely on the device 
at a later date. Unsafe software can also be installed, which 
enable malicious functionality when certain criteria are met, 
such as when a specific time is reached, or a sensor reads a 
certain value. Other examples are software that allows you to 
perform Man-In-The-Middle attacks. These are attacks that 
allow you to monitor, modify, and destroy the data your IoT 
device handles while transporting over the network. The 
device can also be used to stage the spread of a virus or worm 
from the IoT device to access the servers it is talking to [5]. 
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With physical access, it's not just installing malicious 
software on the device the attacker can do. It is also possible 
for the attacker to connect external equipment to the device 
to monitor traffic or perform MITM attacks. Arguably it is 
very important that IoT devices located in the public space 
are well physically secured so that a potential attacker cannot 
access them. Examples of such physical security include the 
device being locked in and the gates on the devices being 
locked or possibly removed [6]. That said, an IoT device that 
is well physically secured may still be vulnerable due to its 
location: Too many IoT devices in remote locations make it 
easy for an attacker to work undisturbed. 
Even though a device is physically protected, there can still 
be ways to attack it. If the device communicates over Wi- Fi 
traffic can be intercepted and data compromised. It is also 
possible to block this Wi-Fi connection with a Wi-Fi 
Deauther or a computer with a wireless network adapter and 
Wi-Fi security testing software, e.g. Aircrack-ng. This can 
also be used for Session hijacking: trying to get access to the 
Wi-Fi network or get the IoT to connect to another Wi-Fi 
hotspot that claims to be the original network [5] - in turn, 
allowing MITM attacks against the IoT device. 
A. Mapping of Attacks using OSI model
Based on many of these types of attacks and security holes, 
we have investigated and surveyed a broader spectre of them. 
To map attacks that one possibly want to protect against in 
IoT devices, a compiled overview related to the Open 
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model is shown in Table 1 
with mapping to the corresponding layers of network 
communication (Table 1). 
B. Certificate Management
In the examples from related research, researchers mainly 
talk about certificates in IoT and not very specifically about 
Certificate Managers. What the architecture of an IoT 
infrastructure often looks like today is that the IoT devices 
are connected to a Gateway that handles the requests from the 
server and the data stream coming from the IoT devices. In 
case an IoT device is not connected to a gateway, the device 
is often a more powerful Single Board Computer (SBC) that 
can handle both the work of a gateway. This SBC has enough 
computing power to encrypt data on its own. One challenge 
is to secure data from non-SBC devices, as many smaller IoT 
devices do not have the resources needed to handle 
certificates, both in terms of memory and processing power. 
As mentioned in the research by Zhihua Li [7], PKI is well 
suited for this as the protocol is mature and robust. It has been 
used in TCP / UDP for a long time. Falk and Fries [8] presents 
the use of Certificate Whitelists (CWL) as a method of 
certificate management. A CWL is a data structure that 
contains references to the certificate's unique serial numbers 
and issuers, the list can be trusted if it is signed by the 
whitelist root key of trust. The backend solution acts as a 
Certificate Manager, which creates lists of approved 
certificates so that IoTs do not communicate with 
unauthorized devices. The idea behind whitelisting 
certificates is that you can add more restrictions and distribute 
different lists to each unit based on what other units it needs 
to communicate with. It should also be possible to place 
restrictions on what kind of protocols are used, so that entities 
with whitelisted certificates that do not use the current 
protocol cannot communicate with the rest of the system. By 
handing over the lists to the devices, and periodically update 
and verify them, the device does not have to contact the server 
each time it communicates with another IoT device. This 
ensures that if the backend server is unavailable, the device 
can check the list it has stored locally over which devices to 
accept. 
The backend solution keeps the status of the certificates at 
regular intervals and checks that the certificates are not 
withdrawn. It can withdraw certificates even by removing 
them from their lists [8]. 
While many view certificates as a good solution for the 
approval and authorization of IoT devices, there are also 
ongoing research highlighting that certificate authorities will 
not be able to handle the scope of 50 billion units of IoT 
devices within a few years. There are. They argue that the 
scope is so large that CAs will not be able to handle the task 
[9]. 
III. CASE COMPANY
This research was conducted together with an industrial 
partner that is a leading national provider of solutions for 
electronic identification and digital payment solutions. They 
are the only nation-wide company that offers internationally 
approved Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificates. They 
provide services such as Extended Validation (EV) SSL 
certificates for both digital identification and signing, and 
electronic ID for retail and corporate customers. They are 
currently expanding to include even further focus on digital 
certificates, public key infrastructure and encryption. 
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A proof of concept solution was implemented, consisting of 
four parts: a Certificate Manager, which is a server solution, 
a WebUI that can be used to administer the Certificate 
Manager, a client running on an IoT device and a Mock 
certificate authority for generating certificates. 
This solution is meant to be so generic that it can be 
implemented in any production system regardless of the 
flavour of the system. Among other things, the IoTs must run 
Linux, and have enough processing power to encrypt / 
decrypt. To illustrate the communication flow between the 
different parts of the Certificate Management system, an 
outline is shown in the figure below.  
Figure 1 High level component flow 
All parts of the solution communicate over APIs, and the 
arrows in the figure above show which parts call each other. 
Certificate Management Admin User Interface does not offer 
any API, so all communication goes from this to the server. 
The IoT Device Client has access to one call to Certificate 
Management Server which is the actual registration of the 
client with the server. The rest of the communication flow 
goes from the server to both Iot Device Client and Mock CA.  
A. CertificateManagementServer
The server side of the solution is designed as a 
Representational State Transfer Application Programming 
Interface (RESTful API). This solution provides functionality 
on the server over the Internet, which other applications and 
services can utilize via http API calls. The framework Spring 
Boot is used to create the APIs and communicate with 
permanent storage in a database. The Administrator UI and 
IoT clients use this API to communicate with the server. The 
API makes it easy for developers to restrict access to the 
functionality of the server, allowing other developers to 
create software that uses the server's functionality without 
being able to access the source code. Further, this also makes 
the solution modular, since it is easier to replace parts of the 
solution, such as user interface, and simply call for the same 
functionality. Therefore, we have also created our own APIs 
separately for both the administrator user interface and the 
IoT clients, to have a clear distinction on what functionality 
should be available for the different parts of the solution. This 
is something that we have followed in the rest of the code 
structure, to keep the classes to their purpose, and to keep the 
responsibilities evenly distributed.  
B. IoT Device Client
The client for the certificate management is developed in 
Java. This can be combined with any configuration file from 
the server configured through a manual installation of the 
client. The client provides an API via Spring Boot so that the 
server can manage the device. The main task of the client is 
to generate Certificate Signing Request (CSR), send it to the 
server, receive a certificate, and store it securely. 
C. Mock Certificate Authority
For testing the Certificate Manager (CM) a custom Certificate 
Authority (CA) is implemented. Ultimately the certificates 
for this solution could become a "subscription" scheme, at the 
discretion of the industry company. The CM server orders to 
itself and is stored in a KeyStore on CA and can be used to 
verify certificate orders for the IoT devices. 
Illustrated in Figure 2 below: 
Figure 2 Issue certificate to IoT. Device 
When an IoT device orders a certificate, it goes through the 
CM server. The CM server sends an API call to the device, 
which responds with a CSR. The CM server signs the CSR 
with a private key and forwards it to CA who can verify the 
signature with the public key on the CM server's certificate. 
It then sends the certificate to the CM who passes it on to the 
IoT device. The IoT sends back the details that the server 
needs about the certificate. Of several available technologies 
to develop a CA solution, the Bouncy Castle framework is 
chosen due to industrial partner compliance. 
V. DISCUSSION
Our software system for Certificate Management is based in 
Open Source architecture stack from WSO2 IoT-Server and 
further developed from scratch in accordance with identified 
characteristics. We decided to only draw inspiration from the 
WSO2 IoT server and further not implement unnecessary 
functionality to keep the scope narrow and measurable. The 
choice of programming language was the next decision to 
make and all modern approaches from C++, C#, Java and 
JavaScript was open options. In collaboration with the 
industry partner and in relation to previous research findings 
the choice landed on Java with a combination of frontend 
JavaScript frameworks. The backend of the Certificate 
Manager was created using Java and the frontend section a 
RESTful application with a separate application in Node.js 
using the API implementation. We use the same technology 
in the client applications as in the backend, a RESTful API 
that the server can use to control the clients. 
As mentioned earlier, less research literature specifically 
addresses Certificate Managers, although the use of 
certificates on IoT devices are well investigated. Since 
certificates are a widespread and robust means of securing 
communication on the Internet, we got the impression that 
there is a general consensus that certificates are the way to 
go. Issues are raised pointing out the fact that many IoT 
devices use microcontrollers that basically cannot bear the 
task of managing certificates. From our implementation the 
same was experienced initially and is why we looked into 
Hardware Security Module as a possible solution. Others talk 
about that responsibility for the issuance of certificates should 
be with the individual manufacturer and not with a CA, the 
amount of IoT devices will reach a level that the CA is unable 
to handle [9]. 
Research articles on using certificates highlight the 
challenges a CA will face if deploying SSL certificates on 
IoT devices. The reason for this is the number of units that 
are estimated to be operational within a few years. One 
possible solution would have been to allow businesses and 
individuals to generate their own certificates for their devices 
so that CAs are not overwhelmed by the number of devices. 
We believe that if a company generates its own certificates 
for its own IoT devices, then it can work if the IoT devices 
only communicate internally within that company, but it does 
not help for external communication. It also does not help a 
customer standing and buying an IoT device with the 
manufacturer's own certificate. It would have been the same 
result that you could sign your own certificates for your own 
websites, then all credibility for certificates will disappear. If 
we move down to the consumer level, we can mostly feel 
confident that if we buy a Philips smart bulb at an electronic 
store, we get a credible product. But as also there are many 
IoT products one gets that certainly do not come with the 
same degree of security [6]. Here it could be an advantage 
with a third party who can approve who the manufacturer is. 
Just because we are dealing with a physical object does not 
mean that we should go for a lower security and just say that 
the responsibility is with the consumer. On the contrary, it is 
perhaps even more important as these are units that become 
part of our home, society and infrastructure. The typical user 
often knows less about safety and does little or no safety 
assessment of the products he / she purchases for his or her 
own household. So instead of saying that CAs can't handle 
the task, it is like that a solid software solution from the CAs 
are needed to perform the task and help improve the security 
of the IoT. 
The certificate manager created should be a link between 
company and CA. It makes it easier for the business to 
implement security from the first moment. Using this 
software solution, you will be able to dynamically expand 
your IoT network as you can introduce any IoT device into 
your network, which is automatically handled by the 
network's security system. If this system is introduced as a 
kind of standard for IoT networks, CA does not have to deal 
with requests from billions of devices, but rather each 
individual IoT network's Certificate Manager. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The IoT industry is still suffering from major security 
shortcomings, despite an increasing focus on the area. This is 
due to both a lack of security expertise among developers and 
a lack of good security solutions for IoT infrastructure. When 
development starts, it is the functionality that places the 
greatest emphasis and security is either forgotten or there 
simply is no time for it. The lack of security is also affected 
by the resource constraints on many IoT devices. Some IoT 
devices have the capacity to run an OS, but the devices most 
widely used today are simple microcontrollers, which often 
have small, simple, and very specific tasks. 
Unfortunately, the overall security level of IoT devices today 
is low, and some devices are not secured at all. Whether this 
is necessary depends on the task of the specific IoT device 
and the data it handles. I.e. the sensor data on the temperature 
where the data is not confidential, does not need the same 
kind of encryption. However, data on a fresh-water system 
that provides drinking water to an entire city it is very critical 
and should be encrypted. 
To resolve this problem, SSL certificates are a secure 
solution. SSL certificates can be used to encrypt 
communications between devices to ensure that this 
communication is private. They can also be used for signing 
messages sent from the devices to verify where the messages 
are coming from. With the findings we have presented in this 
research through a prototype implementation we argue that 
insight is given into what the IoT industry looks like today. 
We think this provides a good foundation for companies to 
move forward with a product strategy should they wish to 
offer security solutions for IoT. Although our solution is a 
proof of concept, future work is needed to be able to see the 
full potential for both making the solution more robust and 
secure, and expanding with more functionality. 
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